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Abstract 
This paper allows for the purchase of both goods in the Hotelling model with linear transport 
costs. Price competition disappears as a result, and we have a stable linear model with the 
Principle of Minimum Differentiation intact. Stability is dependent on equal marginal costs 
for the two producers. 
The new model lends itself well to bundling. Treating the multi-purchase Hotelling 
framework under a monopoly, we find that mixed bundling leads to an intermediate level of 
differentiation with at least half the line between the two goods. Variety is thus greater under 
a monopoly than under the ordinary duopoly. 
Media markets, popularly modelled using two-sided markets, are an example of when 
purchases of multiple brands are common. This paper fills a gap in the literature on multi-
homing in two-sided markets. 
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1 Introduction 
“there are two basic types of competitive 
advantage a firm can possess: low cost or 
differentiation” 
Michael Porter (1985, p. 11) 
 
 
Firms face a fundamental pull between wanting to reach more customers and avoiding the 
price competition that may follow from that tendency. How much to differentiate is 
accordingly a central strategic question. This is doubly so in markets such as newspapers 
where customers often buy from several suppliers at the same time. If this behaviour is due to 
a preference for variety, would that induce firms to move farther away from each other 
because they believe they will sell to most broadminded customers anyway or will it make 
them go completely generic in order to become everyone’s second choice? 
We employ Hotelling’s (1929) linear city model, a classic in the duel between differentiation 
and price competition, and adapt it to accept purchases of two goods with as few changes to 
the core setup as possible. This yields results that can easily be compared to the existing 
literature and allows for quick adoption into new models. Our main result is simple: if the 
willingness to pay for the second good is above a certain level, it will be sold, and firms will 
concentrate in the middle of the market. 
Although linear Hotelling models are notorious for their stability issues (d'Aspremont, 
Gabszewicz, & Thisse, 1979), we argue that this model stands steady as long as multi-
purchasing occurs and the competing firms have equal marginal costs. All other papers in our 
review of the literature have assumed equal or zero costs, so this condition does not hamper 
traditional models. Rather, it points out the crucial role this overlooked parameter plays. 
After the model has been constructed and tested for its effects on competition we apply it to a 
monopoly. In order to see how profit may be extracted from the consumers’ heterogeneity we 
make the monopolist keep both the horizontally differentiated goods and open for the 
possibility of price discrimination through bundling. Differentiation will then be intermediate, 
with at least half the line between the two goods. Compared with the competitive model, 
variety is greater under a monopoly. 
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1.1 Media models need multi-purchasing 
Information goods such as newspapers or music are examples of where purchasing multiple 
brands is common. No one has any use for a second CD of the same album, but many a 
teenager’s room is filled with the sounds of near identical boy bands or rock groups. 
Similarly, there’s little use in reading the same article twice, but two papers covering the same 
story from different angles may still have value enough for a reader to buy both. This model 
will map the conditions for when multiple papers will be bought and the consequences for the 
publishers’ positioning. 
Media models are also a popular topic in the literature of two-sided markets (Armstrong, 
2006; Rochet & Tirole, 2006). This field considers the actions of platforms (the publishers) 
when they receive income from two sides (readers and advertisers) and one side is dependent 
on the other (advertisers pay more to reach more readers). Hotelling’s (1929) linear city is a 
widespread way to give the retail side in these models homogenous preferences. Yet no 
known paper considers how platforms and advertisers would react if readers started buying 
more than one paper. 
Only one study, by Kim and Serfes (2006), has looked at multi-purchasing in a Hotelling 
setting, and although that paper is ground-breaking, it is a mathematically dense exercise due 
to its quadratic transportation costs. In order to make a model that is easy to implement in a 
two-sided structure, we use linear transport and aim for minimal changes to the ordinary 
Hotelling setup. At the expense of certain known stability issues – which will not be a 
problem as long as multi-purchasing occurs – the result is a simple puzzle piece for use in 
future media models. 
The paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2 gives an overview of the literature on Hotelling 
models and on bundling. Chapter 3 establishes the competitive multi-purchase model and 
debates its merits. Chapter 4 tests the same model under a monopoly, which with multiple 
goods leads to bundling. Chapter 5 concludes.  
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2 Literature review 
We will concentrate on goods where the consumers differ in their opinion on which version is 
best. Such goods are said to be horizontally differentiated. Vertical differentiation, where all 
consumers agree on the ranking of the goods, will not be discussed.1 Diversity among 
consumers’ preferences is also a common starting point in the theory of bundling, which we 
will cover in the second part of this chapter. 
Part one of this chapter covers the legacy of Hotelling’s (1929) paper “Stability in 
competition”, which inspired a branch of horizontal differentiation models called address 
models or models of spatial competition. These are systems where firms compete by choosing 
locations in some n-dimensional plane, n representing the competitive attributes in the product 
space, in addition to the usual parameters of price or quantity. Consumers traditionally buy 
only one option based on what gives the highest utility. Other forms of horizontal 
differentiation, such as monopolistic competition2, will not be covered.  
Spatial competition was most actively developed around the 1980s. Some might argue that it 
is a field of research where the cost of finding additional insights is no longer worth the time 
it takes. However, address models are still popular as building blocks in other fields. In 
particular, the topic of two-sided markets has several papers using some form of the Hotelling 
model to form consumer demand (Armstrong, 2006; Choi, 2010; Hagiu, 2009; Peitz & 
Valletti, 2008). A common example of a two-sided market is that of newspapers; a paper 
earns income from both readers and advertisers, and the latter is dependent on the former. Yet 
news is also an instance where one should expect customers to buy more than one brand. In 
order to develop a good model of a two-sided market for newspapers, our understanding of 
multi-purchasing under Hotelling therefore needs to be improved. 
Part two of this chapter covers the topic of bundling. Monopoly behaviour with multi-
purchasing, which we cover in chapter 4, will necessarily involve attempts to exploit the 
spread in consumers’ preferences for the two goods by package selling. A brief introduction 
to bundling is therefore useful. Tying and bundling will in this paper be taken to mean the 
same thing. 
                                                 
1 These are common definitions, but see Gabszewicz and Thisse (1992) for one that also interprets vertical 
differentiation in a spatial setting. 
2 Monopolistic competition is distinguished by an assumption that a change in price by one firm does not alter 
the demand faced by other firms by much (Kreps, 1990; Tirole, 1988). This fits poorly with what we want to 
discuss. 
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2.1 Hotelling’s linear city 
Not everyone buys the cheapest gas; some people just stop at whatever pump is nearest. Even 
with the simplest and seemingly most homogeneous goods, price is not the only competitive 
factor.3 Hotelling (1929) used this recognition to make the smallest possible model of 
differentiation: two goods equal in every way except for one aspect, their placement along a 
straight line. The line may represent a town’s main road, the age profile of a radio station’s 
listeners or the political spectrum from left to right. In terms of a main road, which is why the 
model is often called the linear city model, we can think of placement as the distance 
consumers have to travel to buy gas. Regardless of interpretation, it is the only feature other 
than price to separate the products in the eyes of the consumers, whose preferences are evenly 
spread along the line. Despite his wish to explain competition in terms of more than just price, 
Hotelling concludes that the firms will tend to imitate one another. This has come to be 
known as the Principle of Minimum Differentiation. However, if the firms’ locations are the 
same, then price will be left as the only difference between the products, and the cheapest gas 
should win. 
Transport costs are central to the concept of the linear city. These are the costs from buying a 
good located at another point than where a given consumer is. As a consumer has to “travel” 
farther along the line, his utility falls somewhat. Transport costs were literal in our example 
with a main street, but may just as well be a general expression of dislike where one simply 
holds one’s nose and buys something other than the ideal. Depending on the interpretation, 
different functions may be natural. Starting with the simplest case, Hotelling made these costs 
a linear function of the distance between each consumer and the good. 
Fifty years after Hotelling’s classic, albeit paradoxical paper, d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz and 
Thisse (1979) proved him wrong. They show that the incentive to undercut the opponent’s 
price means that there will not be a tendency to gather at the midpoint, as Hotelling claimed, 
but a troubling instability instead.4 Hotelling’s conclusion was based on observing that the 
firms’ profit functions were increasing as they approached the middle, but d’Aspremont et al. 
show that the only candidate for a price equilibrium has to be some distance away from the 
middle. A placement in the centre by both firms would inevitably lead to price competition 
with the zero-profit Bertrand outcome. These two observations conflict and therefore create 
instability. Furthermore, d’Aspremont et al. demonstrate that with quadratic transportation 
                                                 
3 The history of competition analysis starts with quantity, not price. Martin (2002) covers this well. 
4 Which is ironic given the title of Hotelling’s paper 
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costs instead of the original linear model, the varying degree of price competition along the 
line will give a strategic incentive to differentiate as much as possible. This again contradicts 
Hotelling’s model but also restores meaning to differentiation. Based on these findings, every 
time one of Hotelling’s assumptions is changed to form a new model, two questions must 
therefore be answered: 
1) Does an equilibrium exist? 
2) If so, will we find minimal or maximal differentiation – or something in between? 
 
2.1.1 The purchase of both goods 
Kim and Serfes (2006) were the first to properly contest the assumption that the consumers 
only bought one of the goods. Using quadratic costs they find that under certain conditions the 
Principle of Minimum Differentiation is restored. They motivate their model by saying that 
keeping the single purchase assumption would imply that “consumers do not care for 
diversity” (2006, p. 569) and point out several cases where this is not true. Among the 
examples they use are newspapers, where it is not uncommon for people to read both a tabloid 
and a broadsheet, and two academic journals, where differentiation between a theoretical 
concentration and an empirical periodical does not imply that no one reads both. Indeed, this 
argument seems especially suited to information goods where a second unit of the same good 
has no value but a competing product may still be of interest.5 Minimal differentiation is 
consequently due to an incentive to increase the group of consumers who buy both products. 
Kim and Serfes name this the aggregate demand creation effect. 
The challenge in Kim and Serfes (2006) is that their results rely on complicated conditions 
that make the model hard to interpret or to apply in another theoretical structure. As we will 
see, linear costs solve this problem. The trade-off is that in the cases where no consumer is 
better off by purchasing both goods we are back in the unstable world of Hotelling’s original 
model. 
                                                 
5 Kim and Serfes also use credit cards as an example, but this is harder to justify. What, after all, would be the 
competitive attribute that consumers disagreed about? Card colour? Surely, the value of a card is determined 
more by its credit limit and by the number of stores that accept them. Both of these attributes are such that all 
customers can be expected to have a reasonably identical preference of more being better. Hence, a two-sided 
interpretation as in Rochet and Tirole (2002) or at least a model that includes a vertical quality component such 
as Anderson, Foros and Kind (2012) should be more suitable. 
12 
Our model is also closely related to Choi (2010). His setup starts with Hotelling, has linear 
transport costs and allows the purchase of both goods but does not stop to consider the 
locational incentives of the structure he has created. Instead, he assumes maximal 
differentiation where we show that firms will tend towards none. Choi moves on to set up a 
two-sided market and to test tying strategies. These are interesting applications, but when the 
foundation falters, the setup should be revisited. Still, there is no difference between the first 
building blocks in Choi’s model and ours. Indeed, the choice of the letter λ for a key 
parameter in this paper was directly inspired by Choi. In all, this paper answers the questions 
from Kim and Serfes using Choi’s model. 
Another related work is Anderson, Foros and Kind (2012). Like us, they use a linear Hotelling 
model and allow the purchase of both goods. Unlike us, they include quality as an element of 
vertical differentiation that governs the incremental utility of the second purchase. This allows 
for a more sophisticated model, but also complicates interpretation. Just as we will do, they 
find that prices are strategically independent when both goods are bought. However, they 
study changes in profit in terms of quality instead of the traditional discussion of location. 
This paper adds that piece of the puzzle. 
Every paper on the possibility of buying several goods has its own name for the concept. 
Choi’s (2010) paper calls it multi-homing. Associated with the literature on two-sided markets 
(Armstrong, 2006), applying that label here would risk confusing the reader. Anderson et al. 
(2012) use the term multi-purchasing to mean the same. Kim and Serfes (2006) also talk of 
“multiple purchases”. We will take the terms as synonymous but choose to use multi-
purchasing. 
Variety is also a term related to buying several brands. Sajeesh and Raju (2010, p. 949) define 
variety seeking as “a relative reduction in the willingness to pay of the previously purchased 
brand” and use a Hotelling model with three stages: one for locations and two market stages 
with separate prices. They find that firms differentiate less when there are consumers who 
seek variety, much like we will discover. All consumers have to buy some good twice in their 
model, however, and the question becomes not who participates in multi-purchase but who 
changes his mind and buys a different good in the last stage. Sajeesh and Raju explain variety 
seeking as satiation with the consumers’ first purchase and cite an empirical study which finds 
that the purchase of multiple brands is more likely in markets with small perceived 
differences between the brands. While the three-stage model dictates a behaviour that does 
13 
 
 
not fit our intentions (not all readers buy two newspapers), the motivation behind Sajeesh and 
Raju’s variety seeking is very compatible with ours. Having a preference for variety will in 
this paper therefore refer to a positive utility from buying another brand after one’s most 
preferred option. 
Finally, Anderson and Neven (1989) construct a Hotelling model that only allows the 
purchase of one unit and permits fractions of both in any combination that sums to one. Their 
transport costs are quadratic. They too see a midsection of the line where both goods are 
bought. All consumers who lie between the locations of the firms in Anderson and Neven’s 
model will buy some portion of each good. In contrast, our multi-purchase section can span 
both longer and shorter than the distance between the firms’ locations; even with placements 
at each end of the line we will have consumers who buy only one good. Since mixing means 
obtaining a consumer’s first best configuration, Anderson and Neven find that the social as 
well as the competitive optimum is maximum differentiation. 
Buying fractions of a good is possible for what Anderson and Neven’s (1989) title calls 
“combinable products” such as – citing their own examples – blends of coffee beans to adjust 
the darkness of the brew or alcohol of different strengths for a medium strength punch. In the 
latter case, Anderson and Neven’s model would have one firm sell pure alcohol and the other 
plain water and let each consumer buy what he needs to produce his own cocktail. The farther 
apart the firms move, the greater share of the customers will buy some of both goods – the 
opposite of the aggregate demand creation effect and of intuition. Information goods such as 
news cannot be consumed partially or mixed to an optimal blend. Instead of weighing 
averages, we must sum the full purchases. 
 
2.1.2 Overview of other extensions 
A full survey of the ways in which Hotelling’s assumptions have been tested would distract 
from the purpose of this paper. At the same time some of these extensions are related to our 
topic of multiple purchases and consumers’ preference for variety. What follows is therefore a 
brief look into these fields. Broader overviews can be found in Gabszewicz and Thisse 
(1992), Brenner (2001) or Martin (2002). 
Several papers have allowed for the purchase of many units of the same good in a Hotelling 
setting. Among these, Anderson and Neven (1991) have the firms compete in quantities 
14 
instead of price and find that with linear transport costs there is a unique equilibrium in which 
both firms locate in the middle given a sufficiently high reservation price compared to the 
transport coefficient.6 Rath and Zhao (2001) have the firms compete in prices as usual and 
find a unique equilibrium with quadratic transport costs. The firms locate closer to the centre 
as the reservation price decreases relative to the transport coefficient and will be placed at the 
ends of the line if the ratio of reservation price to transport is too high. While we turn the 
model around by allowing the purchase of both goods but not more than one unit of each, we 
may still expect the relationship between the willingness to pay and the transport cost to be 
important. 
Not all models of horizontal differentiation involve flat lines. Salop (1979) takes Hotelling’s 
main road and joins the ends together to make a circle. Consequently, he avoids having any 
“corners” in the form of maximal differentiation and can instead estimate the number of 
equally-spaced firms the market will sustain. This measures a capacity for variety. Yet such a 
model is only interesting if differentiation is really the best approach. Indeed, Salop proves 
that the equilibrium variety in the circular city will be greater than the social optimum. 
Instead of making a circle, the line can go on forever if the distribution of consumers changes 
from uniform to some continuous function. Of all changes that can be made to the model, this 
is the one most closely related to a potential preference for variety. Neven (1986) finds that 
sufficiently concentrated (heavy in the centre) concave distributions will make the firms 
approach each other even with quadratic transportation costs. Anderson, Goeree and Ramer 
(1997) expand to logconcave distributions with quadratic transportation costs and also find a 
unique solution where more concentrated distributions give closer locations. The result 
requires the distribution not to be too asymmetrical or “too concave”, but many common 
distributions including the normal, gamma and beta are covered. As we know from 
d’Aspremont et al. (1979), quadratic transportation and a uniform distribution of consumers’ 
preferences produce maximal differentiation. From a social welfare point of view, that means 
the firms are too far away from each other. Echoing Salop (1979), Anderson et al. show that 
all the distributions they study will indeed have “excess differentiation”, although none more 
than the uniform. Even when we lump the customers together towards the middle, quadratic 
transportation costs will pull the firms too much apart. 
                                                 
6 This result holds for n firms. Note that Cournot competition means that the firms cover the transport costs and 
are therefore able to discriminate among consumers. Moreover, without the transport costs to consider, the 
consumers see the goods as equal. The details of this model are thus far from what we want to configure. 
15 
 
 
Outside of the world of spatial competition, Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) use the very curvature of 
common utility functions (convexity of the indifference curves to be precise) to study a 
preference for variety. This is elegant, but risks missing the insight of game theory that first 
makes people discuss where gas stations should be placed.7 Dixit and Stiglitz is one of the 
classic papers within monopolistic competition and is as such outside the scope of this study. 
Nevertheless, an insightful bridge between spatial and monopolistic competition can be found 
in Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1989; 1992). Advanced studies of the general Hotelling 
model should start there. 
 
2.2 Bundling 
A monopolist will naturally attempt to coordinate the sales of his two goods. Bundling, which 
is exactly the practice of selling several goods at once to heterogeneous customers, will as 
such be a part of any monopoly version of the multi-purchase model. Most of the mechanics 
of the model are still determined by its spatial properties and not by the literature on bundling, 
however. Below follows only a basic overview of the concepts needed. 
Bundling will in this paper be defined in accordance with Adams and Yellen (1976, p. 475) as 
“the practice of package selling”. A firm can either adopt a pure bundling strategy by offering 
the goods only as one package or a mixed bundling strategy by also selling the goods 
separately. Adams and Yellen show that the profitability of bundling is due to its ability to 
divide consumers by their willingness to pay. If consumers are spread in their valuation of 
either of two goods, but agree in sum, a bundle could extract more consumer surplus than 
single sales by simply setting price equal to that sum. If one consumer has a high valuation of 
one good so that he would buy it individually if he could but a very low valuation of another 
compared to some “midrange” consumers, pricing the bundle to include that extreme 
customer might not be worth the loss of income from the midrange group – hence opening for 
mixed bundling. In Adams and Yellens framework, pure bundling, mixed bundling and single 
sales can all be the most profitable choice depending on how the goods are related. 
Our model breaks one of the assumptions in Adams and Yellen’s (1976) paper because the 
reservation price of our bundle by definition does not equal the sum of each good’s 
reservation price. Dubbed an assumption of independence, it has, in the aftermath of Adams 
                                                 
7 For a thorough critique of the curvature-of-utilities approach, see Lancaster (1971). 
16 
and Yellen, been proven to be unnecessary for their claim that any of the bundling strategies 
may be best (Lewbel, 1985). An address model like ours takes this one step further by 
allowing the firms to choose their own degree of substitutability. 
This paper’s inspiration from Choi (2010) shines through in the use of bundling as well. Both 
models test the implications of the package selling of goods in a linear Hotelling system. Yet 
Choi’s bundle does not contain the same goods as ours. Rather, he ties the sale in the (still 
competitive) Hotelling market to a good in another, monopolized market and finds that tying 
makes more consumers buy from both suppliers. Tying to a monopolized market belongs to 
the leverage theory of bundling (Tirole, 1988, pp. 333-335; Schmalensee, 1982). We will stay 
within the linear city even in our bundling; more than being just a case for exercising 
monopoly power, bundling is about exploiting consumer diversity (Schmalensee, 1984; Bakos 
& Brynjolfsson, 1999). 
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3 Minimal model of multi-purchasing under Hotelling 
Our starting point is Hotelling’s (1929) traditional linear city model. A group of consumers 
whose size is normalized to 1 is uniformly distributed along a line of length 1.8 Two goods 
exist. They are equal in every feature except in the x dimension, where they are placed 
somewhere along the line corresponding to their choice of differentiation. The goods are 
produced by separate firms that compete in prices. Each consumer has a reservation price R 
for a good located exactly where he is placed and incurs a linear cost t per unit of distance 
when he consumes a good located elsewhere. 
In contrast to Hotelling, who required each consumer to buy one and only one good, this 
model opens for a possible purchase of both goods. We assume that no utility can come from 
buying a second unit of the same good. The consumers can thus choose to buy one unit of 
good 1, one of good 2 or one of both. The choice is determined by the option that yields the 
highest utility. When both goods are bought we simply sum the separate utility expressions 
but reduce the reservation price for the second good to λR, where 𝜆 is some percentage so that 
𝜆 ∈ [0,1].9 Consumer surplus under multi-purchasing is always greater than or equal to the 
surplus in the standard model because the consumers are free to choose from the old 
alternatives as well. 
 
3.1 Exogenous locations 
We begin by studying the case of maximal differentiation. Let good 1 be located at 0 and 
good 2 at 1. The utility functions for a consumer located at point x thus become: 
 𝑢1 = 𝑅 − 𝑡𝑥 − 𝑝1 (3.1) 
 𝑢2 = 𝑅 − 𝑡(1 − 𝑥) − 𝑝2 (3.2) 
                                                 
8 Hotelling assumes a line of length l but this is a mere choice of units and does not change anything. 
9 In comparison, Kim and Serfes (2006) go from a reservation price of α to 𝜃, where 𝛼 ≥ 𝜃. Choi (2010) 
employs a utility of b per participant and has mA participants for good/platform A and mB participants for B. He 
further assumes an overlap between the participants of δ such that the total number of participants is 𝑚 = 𝑚𝐴 +  𝑚𝐵 –  𝛿. Defining exclusive participants as 𝜆 =  1 –  𝛿 and assuming that 𝑚𝐴 = 𝑚𝐵 = 1, a consumer 
purchasing both goods receives 𝑏𝑚 =  𝑏(1 +  𝜆). Hence, 𝜃 in Kim and Serfes corresponds to 𝜆𝑏 in Choi, which 
again corresponds to 𝜆𝑅 in this model. The interpretation of λ as a degree of exclusivity or variety is tempting, 
but it should be emphasized that we assume the goods to be equal in all other ways than along the line whereas 
Choi’s setup is due to his model’s two-sidedness. 
18 
 𝑢12 = 𝑅 + 𝜆𝑅 − 𝑡𝑥 − 𝑡(1 − 𝑥) − 𝑝1 − 𝑝2 = (1 + 𝜆)𝑅 − 𝑡 − 𝑝1 − 𝑝2 (3.3) 
We note that u12, the utility from buying both goods, is independent of x when the firms are 
located at opposite ends because the consumer then has to travel the full distance to buy both. 
Plotting the functions in a diagram as in Figure 3.1 gives an immediate overview of when 
each line is on top. Conditions needed for the market to be covered and for both firms to sell a 
positive amount are discussed only in the case with endogenous locations.10 
Figure 3.1: Utilities and location 
 
A consumer buys both goods if u12 is the highest utility curve at his location in Figure 3.1. If 
this is to happen for at least one consumer, u12 must be above the intersection of u1 and u2 at 
the midpoint. This is the same as requiring that 𝑥1 < 𝑥2. Indeed, when we define 𝐷1 = 𝑥2 as 
the demand for good 1 while 𝐷2 = 1 − 𝑥1 is the demand for good 2 we can show that the 
same requirement corresponds to saying 𝐷1 + 𝐷2 > 1, which of course implies that someone 
is buying both.11 
Moving on, we see from the diagram that there will be two indifferent consumers; one, 
located at x1, will be indifferent between buying only good 1 and both while at x2 a consumer 
will be indifferent between consuming good 2 and both. Locating these indifferent consumers 
determines the demand for each good. We use the intersection of u1 and u12 to find x1 and the 
intersection of u12 and u2 to find x2. 
                                                 
10 See Tirole (1988, p. 98) for analysis and graphs of the exogenous, end-of-the-line situation. 
11 This last interpretation is due to Choi (2010). 
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𝑥1 = 1 − 1𝑡 (𝜆𝑅 − 𝑝2) (3.4) 
 
𝑥2 = 1𝑡 (𝜆𝑅 − 𝑝1) (3.5) 
 
3.1.1 Multi-purchase 
Multi-purchase only occurs when 𝑥1 < 𝑥2. Inserting (3.4) and (3.5) yields 
 12 (𝑝1 + 𝑝2) + 12 𝑡 < 𝜆𝑅 (3.6) 
Intuitively, the benefit of buying a second good must be greater than the private cost of 
acquiring it for at least the consumer at the midpoint. The left hand side of (3.6) represents 
expected private cost, using an average price and the transport cost out to one end of the line. 
If this condition is broken, we revert to the standard single purchase outcome. For now we 
suppose that it holds. 
Demand for the goods is now easily determined. 
𝐷1 = 𝑥2 = 1𝑡 (𝜆𝑅 − 𝑝1) 
𝐷2 = 1 − 𝑥1 = 1𝑡 (𝜆𝑅 − 𝑝2) 
Each good is dependent only on its own price. This is contrary to the single-purchase model. 
As we change from an either-or approach to allowing the purchase of both goods their 
competitive nature changes. Now each firm is the sole provider of its sort, giving it a local 
monopoly. Geometrically, x2 is determined only by p1 because that parameter just shifts u12. A 
change in p2, on the other hand, would affect u2 and u12 in equal measures, leaving the 
intersection constant. 
As the demand functions follow the same form, we will continue with generic expressions 
where 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}. 
 
𝐷𝑖 = 1𝑡 (𝜆𝑅 − 𝑝𝑖) (3.7) 
We assume constant marginal costs ci. Choi (2010) does the same but with the added 
assumption that costs are the same for both firms. As Choi inspired the structure of this 
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model, our results will of course be comparable. Kim and Serfes (2006) assume no marginal 
costs. Our results can be simplified to compare, but we will later find that cost differences do 
indeed matter and choose for now to keep our own method. 
The firms compete in prices. The optimization problem is therefore: max
𝑝𝑖
𝜋𝑖 = max
𝑝𝑖
(𝑝𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖)𝐷𝑖 
 First order conditions give 
 
⇒ 𝑝𝑖 = 12 (𝜆𝑅 + 𝑐𝑖) (3.8) 
Second order conditions for a maximum are easily verified. 
Inserting (3.8) back into the demand (3.7) gives 
𝐷𝑖 = 12𝑡 (𝜆𝑅 − 𝑐𝑖) 
Altogether, each firm can expect a profit of 
𝜋𝑖 = �12 (𝜆𝑅 + 𝑐𝑖) − 𝑐𝑖� 12𝑡  (𝜆𝑅 − 𝑐𝑖) = 14𝑡 (𝜆𝑅 − 𝑐𝑖)2 
Interestingly, profit is decreasing in t. This property is inherited from the demand, which is 
now sensitive to what Kim and Serfes (2006) have called the aggregate demand creation 
effect. As t falls, demand reaches farther into the line as more consumers will find it worth the 
transport cost to buy a second good. 
Moving back to the condition for multi-homing to hold, (3.6), we now update it with the price 
expressions. 12 (𝜆𝑅 + 𝑐1) < 2𝜆𝑅 − 𝑡 − 12 (𝜆𝑅 + 𝑐2) 
 
𝑡 + 12 (𝑐1 + 𝑐2) < 𝜆𝑅 (3.9) 
In this form the left hand side of the condition can be compared to the expected social cost of 
an additional purchase. Multi-purchasing would imply that at least the consumer at the 
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midpoint, who would incur a transport cost of 1
2
𝑡, buys both goods. The social condition for 
multi-purchasing is therefore 1
2
𝑡 + 1
2
(𝑐1 + 𝑐2) < 𝜆𝑅 where the second term of the left hand 
side is the expected cost of producing the second unit whereas the right side is the gain from 
the sale. Our model requires twice the transport costs of the socially efficient solution. 
 
3.1.2 Single purchase 
Next, we find the equilibrium if (3.9) does not hold. In other words, we calculate the single 
purchase event. This doubles as a reference for the plain Hotelling model with exogenous 
locations at (0,1). The consumer who is indifferent between the goods is then located at the 
intersection of u1 and u2 in Figure 3.1. We denote the location xS and let a superscript S signal 
the single purchase solution for all parameters. 
𝑥𝑆 = 12 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝12𝑡  
All consumers buy one of the goods, so demand is simply a matter of dividing the line. 
𝐷1 = 𝑥𝑆 = 12 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝12𝑡  
𝐷2 = 1 − 𝑥𝑆 = 12 − 𝑝2 − 𝑝12𝑡 = 12 + 𝑝1 − 𝑝22𝑡  
Demand is now dependent on the competitor’s price. Again we generalize the expression so 
that 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1,2} and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗.  
𝐷𝑖 = 12 + 𝑝𝑗 − 𝑝𝑖2𝑡  
The firms still compete in prices. Their profit’s first order condition gives the following 
reaction function: 
𝑝𝑖 = 12 �𝑝𝑗 + 𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖� 
By knowing pi we also know pj and can therefore insert to find the equilibrium price and 
demand. 
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𝑝𝑖
𝑆 = 3𝑡 + 2𝑐𝑖 + 𝑐𝑗3  
𝐷𝑖
𝑆 = 3𝑡 + 𝑐𝑗 − 𝑐𝑖6𝑡  
 
Single purchase profit is thus 
𝜋𝑖
𝑆 = �3𝑡 + 2𝑐𝑖 + 𝑐𝑗3 − 𝑐𝑖�3𝑡 + 𝑐𝑗 − 𝑐𝑖6𝑡   = 118𝑡 �3𝑡 + 𝑐𝑗 − 𝑐𝑖�2 
In any normal situation, consumers will be free to decide if they want to buy both goods. 
Hence, condition (3.6), which derives from the consumers’ utility, determines whether multi-
purchasing will occur. Yet if the consumers lay the framework, the firms have the final say 
through their pricing decision. We therefore compare profit under single-purchase to multi-
purchase profit. 
𝜋𝑖
𝑆 < 𝜋𝑖𝑀 118𝑡 �3𝑡 + 𝑐𝑗 − 𝑐𝑖�2 < 14𝑡 (𝜆𝑅 − 𝑐𝑖)2 
√2𝑡 + √23 �𝑐𝑗 − 𝑐𝑖� + 𝑐𝑖 < 𝜆𝑅 
For equal costs this is a stricter condition than the inequality for multi-purchasing, (3.9). 
Hence, there will be some interval where multi-purchasing will not be the most profitable 
choice for the firms. Alas, when locations stop being fixed, there will be no corresponding 
single purchase equilibrium to compare with. 
 
3.2 Endogenous locations 
We expand the model to a game with two stages. First the firms choose locations. Then they 
compete in prices like before. Backwards induction is used to solve the game. 
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As the naming is arbitrary, let firm 1 be the leftmost of the two. It is then located at a distance 
a from the left of the line, while firm 2 is located at a distance b from the right.12 Keeping the 
names in order implies 𝑎 + 𝑏 ≤ 1. 
To allow for the possibility that consumers may be on both sides of the firms’ locations we 
need to use absolute differences in the transport cost term in the utility expressions. Other 
than that, they are as before. 
𝑢1 = 𝑅 − 𝑡|𝑥 − 𝑎| − 𝑝1 
𝑢2 = 𝑅 − 𝑡|(1 − 𝑏) − 𝑥| − 𝑝2 
𝑢12 = 𝑅 + 𝜆𝑅 − 𝑡|𝑥 − 𝑎| − 𝑡|(1 − 𝑏) − 𝑥| − 𝑝1 − 𝑝2 = (1 + 𝜆)𝑅 − 𝑡(|𝑥 − 𝑎| + |1 − 𝑏 − 𝑥|) − 𝑝1 − 𝑝2 
The utility of buying both goods is no longer fully independent of x. Only between a and b 
will the total distance travelled to buy both be constant such that u12 is a flat line. Outside of 
the interval the double transport will make the fall in utility steeper than for the single 
purchase curves. This is illustrated in Figure 3.2 below, which shows the utility functions over 
the preference line when the firms have chosen to place themselves at locations a and 1 − 𝑏. 
Figure 3.2: Utilities for a given (a,b) location set 
 
The locations of the indifferent consumers are now 
𝑢1 = 𝑢12 
                                                 
12 The naming of the location variables follows the convention established by Hotelling (1929) and used by 
d’Aspremont et al. (1979). However, Kim and Serfes (2006) let b be the distance from the left. Direct 
comparisons with that paper can therefore not be made. Note also that although convention shortens the 
exogenous and endogenous cases to (0,1) and (a,b) respectively, these are not on the same form. Extreme 
differentiation would imply a = b = 0, which gives (a,b) = (0,0), not the ususal (0,1). Still, this is an inconsistency 
that we are willing to live with. 
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𝑅 − 𝑡|𝑥1 − 𝑎| − 𝑝1 = (1 + 𝜆)𝑅 − 𝑡(|𝑥1 − 𝑎| + |1 − 𝑏 − 𝑥1|) − 𝑝1 − 𝑝2 
|1 − 𝑏 − 𝑥1| = 1𝑡 (𝜆𝑅 − 𝑝2) 
 
⇒ 𝑥1 = 1 − 𝑏 − 1𝑡 (𝜆𝑅 − 𝑝2) (3.10) 
 
𝑢2 = 𝑢12 
𝑅 − 𝑡|1 − 𝑏 − 𝑥2| − 𝑝2 = (1 + 𝜆)𝑅 − 𝑡(|𝑥2 − 𝑎| + |1 − 𝑏 − 𝑥2|) − 𝑝1 − 𝑝2 
|𝑥2 − 𝑎| = 1𝑡 (𝜆𝑅 − 𝑝1) 
 
⇒ 𝑥2 = 𝑎 + 1𝑡 (𝜆𝑅 − 𝑝1) (3.11) 
 
3.2.1 Firm restrictions 
We rule out the possibilities that 1 − 𝑏 − 𝑥1 < 0 or 𝑥2 − 𝑎 < 0 because this would imply that 
firm 1 would locate itself to the right of all its customers (or, for firm 2, to the left). Even if 
only one of the two were true, so that the naming of the firms might still be correct, that 
would simply not make sense. 
One set of locations can be ruled out as possible Nash equilibria right away. These are the 
combinations where one single purchase utility curve is strictly above the other so that the 
lower firm has no customers. Clearly, that firm would then want to change its placement 
strategy. In other words we want 𝑢1 and 𝑢2 to cross at some point. Let that point be called 𝑥�, 
which we will now find. 
𝑢1 = 𝑢2 ⇒ |1 − 𝑏 − 𝑥�| − |𝑥� − 𝑎| = 1𝑡 (𝑝1 − 𝑝2) 
The intersection does not exist if 1 − 𝑏 < 𝑥� while 𝑥� ≥ 𝑎 or if 1 − 𝑏 ≥ 𝑥� while 𝑥� < 𝑎. Two 
combinations remain. Later, using Figure 3.3, we will show that second of these is impossible. 
For now, we conclude that if 1 − 𝑏 ≥ 𝑥� while 𝑥� ≥ 𝑎, then 
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𝑥� = 12 (1 + 𝑎 − 𝑏) − 12𝑡 (𝑝1 − 𝑝2) (3.12) 
Whereas if 1 − 𝑏 < 𝑥� while 𝑥� < 𝑎, then 
 
𝑥� = 12 (1 + 𝑎 − 𝑏) + 12𝑡 (𝑝1 − 𝑝2) (3.13) 
 
3.2.2 Consumer restrictions 
In addition, we check that 𝑥1 > 0 and 𝑥2 < 1 so that they lie within the line we allow the 
firms to differentiate over. This implies that 𝐷2 < 1 and 𝐷1 < 1, respectively. In practice this 
means that we want some consumers in each category: some buy only good 1, some buy both 
and some buy only good 2. Substituting (3.10) and (3.11) into these assumptions we find the 
following inequalities: 
𝑝2 > 𝜆𝑅 − 𝑡(1 − 𝑏) 
𝑝1 > 𝜆𝑅 − 𝑡(1 − 𝑎) 
Intuitively, both intersections in our model occur within the length of x as long as each 
incremental good is too expensive for at least the person farthest away. Without these 
requirements we could see all customers buying both goods. 
d’Aspremont et al. (1979) prove that any single-purchase equilibrium must satisfy equivalent 
conditions of intersection within the line. Crucially, their proof of instability relies on the 
resulting inequalities to select the price with which the firms will try to undercut the other. 
Yet the prices do not interact in our model. 
We know from d’Aspremont et al. (1979) that the model with linear transport costs breaks 
down under single purchase conditions. Studying the effects of multi-purchase thus becomes 
all the more interesting. We begin with the alignment of intersections in Figure 3.2 that multi-
homing requires. 
𝑥1 < 𝑥2 
1 − 𝑏 − 1
𝑡
(𝜆𝑅 − 𝑝2) < 𝑎 + 1𝑡 (𝜆𝑅 − 𝑝1) 
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 12 (𝑝1 + 𝑝2) + 12 (1 − 𝑎 − 𝑏)𝑡 < 𝜆𝑅 (3.14) 
 
All together we can sum up the conditions needed for multi-purchasing in Table 3.1 below. 
Table 3.1: Consumer conditions required for multi-purchasing 
Consumer behaviour Constraint 
Geometric 
interpretation Condition 
Some buy both goods 𝐷1 + 𝐷2 > 1 𝑥1 < 𝑥2 12 (𝑝1 + 𝑝2) + 12 (1 − 𝑎 − 𝑏)𝑡 < 𝜆𝑅 
Not all buy good 1 𝐷1 < 1 𝑥2 < 1 𝑝1 + 𝑡(1 − 𝑎) > 𝜆𝑅 
Not all buy good 2 𝐷2 < 1 𝑥1 > 0 𝑝2 + 𝑡(1 − 𝑏) > 𝜆𝑅 
 
 
3.2.3 Multi-purchase 
Assuming that the required inequalities hold, we continue with the expressions for demand. 
𝐷1 = 𝑥2 = 𝑎 + 1𝑡 (𝜆𝑅 − 𝑝1) 
𝐷2 = 1 − 𝑥1 = 𝑏 + 1𝑡 (𝜆𝑅 − 𝑝2) 
Not only is demand still independent of the competitor’s price, we find that the competitor’s 
location does not matter either. This continues the argument about local monopolies from the 
exogenous case. 
Moving on, we solve the general case where 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}, 𝑎1 = 𝑎 and 𝑎2 = 𝑏. 
 
𝐷𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖 + 1𝑡 (𝜆𝑅 − 𝑝𝑖) (3.15) 
First order conditions yield the reaction function. 
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑖
= 𝐷𝑖 + (𝑝𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖)𝜕𝐷𝑖𝜕𝑝𝑖  
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= 𝑎𝑖 + 1𝑡 (𝜆𝑅 − 𝑝𝑖) − (𝑝𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖) 1𝑡 = 0 
 
⇒ 𝑝𝑖 = 12 (𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝑅 + 𝑐𝑖) (3.16) 
Again, second order conditions for a maximum are easily verified. (3.16) shows that price is 
increasing in ai. Mathematically this is inherited from the demand, which we would indeed 
expect to increase as the firm got closer to the middle. When the firm moves closer to more 
customers, the consumers’ transport costs fall. With the local monopolies intact the firms are 
able to capture some of this benefit. (3.16) solves step two of the game. 
Inserting (3.16) back into (3.15) produces the equilibrium demand, which increases as the 
firm advances along the line. 
 
𝐷𝑖 = 12𝑡 (𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝑅 − 𝑐𝑖) (3.17) 
Step one is the firms’ choice of location. To find this we combine (3.16) and (3.17) and 
complete the profit function. 
𝜋𝑖 = (𝑝𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖)𝐷𝑖  = �12 (𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝑅 + 𝑐𝑖) − 𝑐𝑖� 12𝑡 (𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝑅 − 𝑐𝑖) = 14𝑡 (𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝑅 − 𝑐𝑖)2 
The profit is clearly increasing in 𝑎𝑖. Differentiation tends towards the minimal. Summing up 
we have: 
 
Proposition 1: When multi-purchasing occurs in a covered market, the firms will profit from 
moving closer together �𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑎𝑖
> 0�. 
 
3.2.4 Equilibrium location 
The footsteps of Kim and Serfes (2006), who we set out to follow, stop here. Yet the hasty 
conclusion of Hotelling (1929) himself and d’Aspremont et al.’s (1979) subsequent refutation 
have shown that we cannot simply be satisfied by a positive first derivative. Indeed, since we 
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have used linear costs just like Hotelling, an increasing tendency was to be expected. The 
conclusion to the preceding subchapter answered the second question that d’Aspremont et al. 
taught us to ask, but we still need to establish whether an equilibrium exists. 
Returning to the table of conditions necessary for multi-purchasing gives us Table 3.2 after 
the price function has been substituted into the previous expressions. An interval of values of 
λ for which multi-purchasing will occur is beginning to take shape. 
Table 3.2: Consumer conditions required for multi-purchasing in price equilibrium 
Consumer behaviour Constraint 
Geometric 
interpretation Equilibrium condition 
Some buy both goods 𝐷1 + 𝐷2 > 1 𝑥1 < 𝑥2 �1 − 12 (𝑎 + 𝑏)� 𝑡 + 12 (𝑐1 + 𝑐2) < 𝜆𝑅 
Not all buy good 1 𝐷1 < 1 𝑥2 < 1 (2 − 𝑎)𝑡 + 𝑐1 > 𝜆𝑅 
Not all buy good 2 𝐷2 < 1 𝑥1 > 0 (2 − 𝑏)𝑡 + 𝑐2 > 𝜆𝑅 
 
Compared to that for exogenous (0,1) locations, the condition needed for at least some 
consumers to buy both goods is weaker for all other values of a and b under endogenous 
locations. Multi-purchasing is therefore more likely to occur when the firms are able to 
choose their degree of differentiation. 
Indeed, if λ is big enough to break the last two conditions in Table 3.2, then all consumers will 
buy both goods. These requirements are the same as asking that the single purchase utility 
curves are on top at each end of the line, meaning 𝑢12(0) < 𝑢1(0) and 𝑢12(1) < 𝑢2(1). 
Going back to the conditions necessary for the single purchase utility curves to intersect, we 
can use our price function to get another look at the limits of what combinations of a and b are 
reasonable. Recall that we required either 1 − 𝑏 ≥ 𝑥�  while 𝑥� ≥ 𝑎, or 1 − 𝑏 < 𝑥� while 𝑥� < 𝑎. 
For the first case, substituting (3.16) into (3.12) gives 2 + 1
𝑡
(𝑐1 − 𝑐2) ≥ 𝑎 + 3𝑏  while 2 − 1
𝑡
(𝑐1 − 𝑐2) ≥ 3𝑎 + 𝑏. In the second case, substituting (3.16) into (3.13) gives 2 +
1
𝑡
(𝑐1 − 𝑐2) < 𝑎 + 3𝑏  while 2 − 1𝑡 (𝑐1 − 𝑐2) < 3𝑎 + 𝑏. These lines are plotted in Figure 3.3 
together with the old restriction that 𝑎 + 𝑏 ≤ 1 and an assumption of equal marginal costs. As 
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can easily be seen geometrically, the second case is incompatible with 𝑎 + 𝑏 ≤ 1 in all other 
points than 𝑎 = 𝑏 = 1
2
.  
Figure 3.3: Permissible combinations of a and b 
 
If marginal costs are not equal, the disadvantaged firm’s possible locations will be limited and 
its competitor’s set expanded. Below, Figure 3.4 shows the same lines as before but with the 
permissible area shifted by a cost difference of one in favour of firm 2. The difference is 
softened by the effect of transport costs, which makes consumers hesitant to change goods 
even in the face of price differences. The kink now comes at (0.4, 0.6). Note that the midpoint 
is only reachable if costs are equal. 
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Figure 3.4: Permissible combinations of a and b with a cost difference 
 
Along the edges of the areas in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 the two single purchase utility 
curves will overlap for some portion of the x-line. Consumers will be indifferent between the 
goods in the case of an overlap and should be assumed to randomize between them. Expected 
demand for one firm across an overlap is therefore half of the mass of consumers covered. 
Proposition 1 tells us that any location inside the area cannot be optimal because it would be 
more profitable to move out towards the edges. A move beyond the line 𝑎 + 𝑏 = 1 would be 
the same as swapping names for the two firms, and the incentives would then change 
direction, pulling back towards the line. 
Overlapping utility curves have to affect at least one firm’s side of the market entirely since 
there is no change in the utility curves’ slope to break them apart. Panel a) in Figure 3.5 
illustrates a partial overlap where firm 1 has twice the marginal cost of firm 2 and they have 
chosen symmetric locations at 𝑎 = 𝑏 = 0.45.13 Partial overlaps are also possible without a 
cost difference. Randomizing demand for as long as the consumers are indifferent between 
the goods means that firm 2 still dominates on the right side whereas firm 1 “shares” his side. 
An infinitesimally small change in location backwards by firm 1, as shown in panel b) in 
Figure 3.5, will allow it to capture the other half of that demand. Since the move will only 
cause a very small change in price, the increased demand should result in greater profits. This 
suggests that partial overlaps cannot be Nash equilibria. 
                                                 
13 All in all 𝑅 = 10, 𝜆 = 0.5, 𝑡 = 5, 𝑐1 = 2, 𝑐2 = 1. In panel a) 𝑎 = 𝑏 = 0.45. In panel b) 𝑎 = 0.4. The size of 
the move backwards has been chosen for graphic effect and would in reality be expected to be much smaller. 
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Figure 3.5: a) Partial overlap b) Firm 1 moves back slightly 
 
 
Figure 3.6: a) Full overlap b) Firm 2 moves back slightly 
 
A full overlap occurs in the kinks of Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4. This time demand is shared on 
both sides. Panel a) of Figure 3.6 shows a full overlap when firm 1 again has twice the 
marginal cost of firm 2 and they select the same location.14 The share of consumers lying to 
the right of the firms’ locations is larger than that to the left due to the shift in the kink’s 
location coming from firm 2’s cost advantage. Consequently, firm 2 would gain more demand 
on the right hand side by retreating somewhat than it would lose on the left hand side. Once 
more, overlaps seem unstable. 
The exception to this conclusion is at the midpoint because a full overlap would be of equal 
length on both sides. Here, the demand gained by one side by moving slightly is nothing more 
than the demand lost on the other side. Expected demand is then equal to what we get using 
our old, deterministic approach. Crucially, the midpoint location is only possible with equal 
costs. 
                                                 
14 As before 𝑅 = 10, 𝜆 = 0.5, 𝑡 = 5, 𝑐1 = 2, 𝑐2 = 1. This gives 𝑎 = 0.4 and 𝑏 = 0.6 in panel a). Panel b) sees 
𝑏 = 0.55. Again, the size of the move is chosen with visibility in mind, not reality. 
32 
Proving that overlaps are not viable strategies has turned out to be a mathematically 
intractable problem. The theory is therefore left in the following form: 
 
Conjecture 1: Given that multi-purchasing occurs, a unique equilibrium exists at the 
midpoint if the firms have equal costs. No equilibrium exists with unequal costs. 
 
From now on, we assume that the firms have equal costs. That is, 𝑐1 = 𝑐2 = 𝑐. 
If Conjecture 1 is true, the Principle of Minimal Differentiation is restored. The midpoint 
equilibrium results in Figure 3.7. Updating the table of conditions to reflect the positions and 
costs gives us Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3: Consumer conditions required for multi-purchasing in placement equilibrium 
Consumer behaviour Constraint 
Geometric 
interpretation 
Condition when 𝑎 = 𝑏 = 1
2
 
and 𝑐1 = 𝑐2 = 𝑐 
Some buy both goods 𝐷1 + 𝐷2 > 1 𝑥1 < 𝑥2 12 𝑡 + 𝑐 < 𝜆𝑅 
Not all buy good 1 𝐷1 < 1 𝑥2 < 1 32 𝑡 + 𝑐 > 𝜆𝑅 
Not all buy good 2 𝐷2 < 1 𝑥1 > 0 32 𝑡 + 𝑐 > 𝜆𝑅 
 
Figure 3.7: Utility with equilibrium locations 
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In Figure 3.7 above, u1 and u2 overlap completely.15 This does not mean that both firms will 
serve all the customers. Any multi-purchase is still represented by u12. What it does mean is 
that the consumers who only buy a single good are indifferent between the goods. Expected 
demand for either firm is half of the overlap plus the multi-purchasing group. We could 
randomize the sales over the line, but the symmetry means that our old definitions of D1 and 
D2 ensure a proportional allocation already. 
 
3.2.5 Market coverage 
Another potential problem with our definitions of demand would occur if the market were not 
covered. That is, if the focus on the pull towards the centre made us forget to check if the 
consumers at the ends of the line still wanted to buy anything. They will do so as long as their 
utility is positive in at least one case. Our previous assumption that there will be demand for 
each good sold separately means that the single purchase utility curves will be on top at the 
ends. Algebraically, we should verify that 𝑢1(0) ≥ 0 and 𝑢2(1) ≥ 0 in our proposed 
equilibrium. The former solves to 
𝑅 ≥ 𝑎𝑡 + 𝑝1 
 2𝑅 − 32 𝑡 − 𝑐 ≥ 𝜆𝑅 (3.18) 
Solving 𝑢2(1) ≥ 0 gives an equivalent condition.  
If (3.18) fails and the market is not covered, the system becomes even less dependent on 
location because it does not matter which part of the line is left unserved. Suppose the firms 
have simply placed themselves somewhere along the line, illustrated in Figure 3.8 below, in 
such a way that not all consumers choose to buy anything. That is, the market is not covered. 
Figure 3.8: Demand when the market is not covered 
 
                                                 
15 The graph was made using the following parameters: 𝑅 = 10, 𝜆 = 0.5, 𝑡 = 5, 𝑐 = 1 
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Each of the four points in Figure 3.8 lies where a utility curve binds. For 𝑥1𝐿 we solve 
𝑢1(𝑥1𝐿) = 0. For 𝑥1𝑅 we solve 𝑢12(𝑥1𝑅) − 𝑢2(𝑥1𝑅) = 0 ⇒ 𝑢12(𝑥1𝑅) = 𝑢2(𝑥1𝑅). Naturally, 
the model only works if 𝑥1𝐿 > 0 and 𝑥2𝑅 < 1, the opposite of the previous system. Assume 
that 𝑎 ∈ (𝑥1𝐿 ,𝑥1𝑅) and (1 − 𝑏) ∈ (𝑥2𝐿 ,𝑥2𝑅). This is the only necessary restriction on the 
firms’ placement, but to say that they locate somewhere within the interval they serve is 
hardly controversial. Calculating for firm 1 gives 
𝑥1𝐿 = 𝑎 − 1𝑡 (𝑅 − 𝑝1) 
𝑥1𝑅 = 𝑎 + 1𝑡 (𝜆𝑅 − 𝑝1) 
Note that this model takes multi-purchasing over some interval for granted. To test when that 
is correct, let 𝑥2𝐿 < 𝑥1𝑅. Simple substitution shows that this solves to the same inequality, 
(3.14), as in the full coverage model where we test 𝑥1 < 𝑥2. 
𝐷1 = 𝑥1𝑅 − 𝑥1𝐿 = 1
𝑡
[(1 + 𝜆)𝑅 − 2𝑝1] 
Demand is independent of location and of the competitor. Firm 2 has an equivalent demand 
function. Kim and Serfes’ (2006) aggregate demand creation effect is gone since the new 
expression of demand lacks any dependence on a. The effect is therefore a consequence of the 
one-sidedness of the covered model where each firm is sure to keep its hinterland and the only 
customers worth chasing are in the middle. There is no aggregate demand creation until all 
consumers buy at least one good. 
Moving on, the solution is generalized for firm 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}. 
First order conditions for the basic profit function, 𝜋𝑖 = (𝑝𝑖 − 𝑐)𝐷𝑖, are 
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑖
= 1
𝑡
[(1 + 𝜆)𝑅 − 2𝑝𝑖] + (𝑝𝑖 − 𝑐) �−2 1𝑡� = 0 
⇒ 𝑝𝑖 = 14 [(1 + 𝜆)𝑅 + 2𝑐] 
Second order conditions are easily verified. We substitute price into demand and find total 
profit. 
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𝐷𝑖 = 12𝑡 [(1 + 𝜆)𝑅 − 2𝑐] 
𝜋𝑖 = 18𝑡 [(1 + 𝜆)𝑅 − 2𝑐]2 
Comparing the uncovered profit to the covered model will not tell us when either option is 
better than the other. The price reaction functions differ between the two models such that the 
assumptions behind each model will not be true at the same time. For any combination of 
parameters the assumptions of at most one model will hold. A proof can be found in the 
appendix. To compare profit is futile since one does not have the opportunity to select 
between the models. 
To test that this model really is not fully covered we let the length 𝑙 equal 𝑥2𝑅 − 𝑥1𝐿 and 
require 𝑙 < 1. This solves to 
 2𝑅 < 𝑡(𝑎 + 𝑏) + 𝑝1 + 𝑝2 (3.19) 
Compared to the condition for market coverage that introduced this subchapter, we see that 
the inequality is nothing more than a combination of 𝑢1(0) < 0 and 𝑢2(1) < 0. Substituting 
the new price reaction function gives 
 (3 − 𝜆)𝑅 < 2𝑡(𝑎 + 𝑏) + 2𝑐 (3.20) 
In addition, we still require multi-purchasing. Hence, we substitute the price into 𝑥2𝐿 < 𝑥1𝑅, 
which we know equals 1
2
(𝑝1 + 𝑝2) + 12 𝑡(1 − 𝑎 − 𝑏) < 𝜆𝑅 just like in the covered case. 
Doing so results in the following expression: 
 2𝑡(1 − 𝑎 − 𝑏) + 2𝑐 < (3𝜆 − 1)𝑅 (3.21) 
Both (3.20) and (3.21) are needed if the model for an uncovered market is to work. Using the 
fact that 𝜆 ∈ [0,1] because 𝜆 is defined as a percentage gives the following relation between 
the inequalities: 2𝑡(1 − 𝑎 − 𝑏) + 2𝑐 < (3𝜆 − 1)𝑅 ≤ 2𝑅 ≤ (3 − 𝜆)𝑅 < 2𝑡(𝑎 + 𝑏) + 2𝑐 2𝑡 < 4𝑡(𝑎 + 𝑏) 12 < 𝑎 + 𝑏 
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Even though the firms are free to decide their precise placement, we can see that they have to 
stay relatively close together if some consumers are to buy both goods while others buy none. 
Whether the firms will be able to coordinate that placement is beyond the topic of this paper. 
 
3.3 Discussion of results 
Hotelling’s (1929) assumption that only one of the two goods could be bought was removed 
because in practice it is hard to restrict consumers from buying what they want. Consumers 
should be able to add their two utility expressions when that outcome is better for them. 
Multi-purchasing is not just an expansion to fit other models but an adjustment to reality. 
We set out to test Kim and Serfes’ (2006) arguments using Choi’s (2010) linear model. 
Similar to their quadratic version, we find that multi-purchasing will support the Principle of 
Minimum Differentiation if certain conditions are met. We have provided easy geometric and 
economic interpretations of these conditions, and this may be considered one of the strengths 
of the linear approach. Still, should the conditions not hold, the linear model would be thrown 
back into instability. 
 
3.3.1 The Principle of Minimum Differentiation 
The Principle of Minimum Differentiation does not fit well with Hotelling’s intentions.16 
Where we want to model differentiation, we get imitation. Depending on one’s expectations, 
this may be a more interesting conclusion than the opposite. Political competition (Downs, 
1957) is an example of when it is as important to explain imitation as polarization. Clustering 
(Porter, 2000) is another example of when (geographic) differentiation is in fact the 
hypothesis we want to reject. On the other hand, we are still at a loss when it comes to 
explaining any incentives to differentiate. 
Furthermore, if the goods are located in the same spot, they have become identical. Then there 
is no longer a reason to allow multi-purchasing but not a second purchase of one good. Such 
equality should, as in d’Aspremont et al. (1979), lead to pure price competition, which points 
                                                 
16 And to complicate matters, the Principle was not true to Hotelling’s own model – regardless of his intentions. 
Martin (2002, p. 116) said it well: “Hotelling failed in the same way Columbus failed. Columbus did not 
discover a westward sea route to India, and Hotelling did not demonstrate a tendency for firms to minimize 
differentiation”  
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to a Bertrand solution where all profit is competed away. This “same-but-different” result is 
an unavoidable weakness in any Hotelling model with minimal differentiation. 
 
3.3.2 Stability 
Hotelling’s original model is unstable because the only candidate for a price equilibrium 
requires that the two firms are located somewhat apart at the same time as their profit 
functions tell them to move closer. The condition that requires the firms to stay apart comes 
from a comparison of the possible equilibrium with the complete sales to be had by 
undercutting the competitor’s price by just more than total transport costs, which would make 
all customers come to that firm. This incentive to undercut is removed when multi-purchasing 
is allowed. Pricing is now independent of what the competitor’s does, as seen in (3.16). All 
that is left is Kim and Serfes’ (2006) aggregate demand creation effect. As long as the 
conditions for multi-purchasing to occur hold, our model is stable. 
The conjecture about instability in the face of cost differences is new to the literature. All 
comparable papers assume equal (Choi, 2010; Anderson & Neven, 1989) or even zero (Kim 
& Serfes, 2006; Anderson, Foros, & Kind, 2012; Sajeesh & Raju, 2010) marginal costs. It 
turns out that this is a knife-edge assumption; any deviation from the traditional practice could 
potentially throw the system off. In addition to the need for a proof of Conjecture 1, an 
investigation of cost differences in a multi-purchase model with quadratic transportation costs 
is therefore a useful path for future study. 
 
3.3.3 Second reservation price 
Multi-purchasing is supported solely by the second reservation price, 𝜆𝑅, which may in the 
end seem arbitrary. When the goods are supposed to be equal in every other way than along 
the line it is admittedly strange to allow the consumer to be willing to pay for a second 
version. Problems in interpreting the second reservation price are still essential in comparing 
our results to those in the papers that motivated our exercise. This model attempts to simplify 
the problem by relating the second reservation price to the first. Whereas Kim and Serfes 
(2006) introduce a completely new variable for the second reservation price, stating only that 
it is less than for the first, this model lets some degree λ of the original willingness to pay 
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remain.17 This interpretation underlines how the second good is simply lower ranked and at 
the same time opens for the possibility of making λ a function of decisions taken in an 
expanded system. 
Kim and Serfes (2006, p. 587) suggest that their own incremental utility should be a function 
of the location and will “depend on a given market”. The latter is obviously true. But without 
any other motivation or assumptions, to turn that precaution into an analysis of derivatives 
like they do becomes a purely academic exercise. Indeed, to make λ dependent on a and b is 
in effect to say that transport costs are not the only difference between the goods. This 
disturbs a central element in how we think about the Hotelling model and is therefore not part 
of what we call our “minimal” model. Rather, future research might let λ depend on the 
shared characteristics of the goods. 
Turning back to Choi (2010) – whose model we have built on and whose use of reservation 
prices is in fact dependent on other layers of the model – reveals a weakness in his 
assumptions as well. In his setup the reservation price is based on the amount of content 
available with each purchase option, and he assumes that the two alternative platforms are 
based at the extremes of Hotelling’s line. Buying both options gives a reservation price equal 
to the sum of content available minus any overlap. We now know that the platforms will have 
an incentive to move closer. This will make the content providers, whose product is delivered 
through the intermediary platforms, less likely to distinguish between the alternatives. An 
assumption of placement at the ends of the line occurs often in the literature on two-sided 
markets (Armstrong, 2006), and Proposition 1 shows that it is not sustainable. 
 
3.3.4 Transport function 
Transport can also be thought of as a unit cost of substitution and consequently as a 
competitive barrier. In the standard, single purchase quadratic case, which leads to maximum 
differentiation, profit is increasing in t. The higher the consumers’ cost of choosing another 
product, the higher profits the firms make. 
With linear transport, multi-purchasing and a covered market, profit is increasing in t only if 
𝑡 > 𝜆𝑅−𝑐
𝑎𝑖
, which turns into 1
2
𝑡 + 𝑐 > 𝜆𝑅 for the optimal location 𝑎𝑖 = 12. Table 3.3 tells us that 
the inequality has to turn the other way in order for multi-purchasing to occur. Multi-
                                                 
17 In terms of Kim and Serfes (2006), where the first reservation price is 𝛼 and the second is 𝜃, 𝜆 = 𝜃/𝛼. 
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purchasing ensures that the aggregate demand creation effect is stronger than t’s role as a 
competitive barrier. In an uncovered market, profit is always decreasing in t because firms can 
no longer use transport to push up price at all. Again, multi-purchasing turns the nature of 
competition around. 
 
Proposition 2: Under multi-purchasing, increasing unit costs of transport decreases profit 
�
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑡
< 0�. 
 
The choice of transport cost function is the final determinant of the system’s stability and 
direction. It should not be modelled based only on mathematical elegance. Rather, the choice 
between linear, quadratic and any other cost function must be made with an eye to the real 
world. The interpretations of t are many. Literal transport (Hotelling, 1929) is one which may 
suit a linear form, as may distance in terms of time (Salvanes, Steen, & Sørgard, 2005), but 
differentiation can also be political (Downs, 1957) with t representing a dislike of other 
ideologies, which for some would certainly come at a higher order. The function must follow 
reality, not the other way around. If instability haunts us, that does not call for a change of 
transport costs but of business model. 
 
3.3.5 Interpretation in media markets 
The motivation to test multi-purchasing comes from media markets. While the model we have 
seen is meant for use in greater systems and is far too abstract to be put into a business 
context, it is still important that the results have real interpretations. What follows is an 
indication of how the linear multi-purchasing model can be applied to the market for news in 
future research. 
An immediate prediction is that newspapers will tend towards the same, generic product. Two 
popular interpretations of location in media markets are the political spectrum and a tabloid-
broadsheet scale. Many markets have papers that are traditionally thought to speak with either 
a conservative or a liberal viewpoint, but our results add fuel to the popular claim that such 
differences are in name only and that all mainstream media is the same. 
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Newspapers, especially online, are unlikely to look for a competitive advantage in marginal 
costs. Indeed, the costs are probably relatively small. Assuming that our first, competitive 
model’s two firms have zero variable costs gives us Table 3.4.  
Table 3.4: Consumer conditions required for multi-purchasing in placement equilibrium with equal costs 
Consumer behaviour Constraint 
Geometric 
interpretation 
Condition when 𝑎 = 𝑏 = 1
2
 
and 𝑐1 = 𝑐2 = 0 
Some buy both goods 𝐷1 + 𝐷2 > 1 𝑥1 < 𝑥2 12 𝑡 < 𝜆𝑅 
Not all buy good 1 𝐷1 < 1 𝑥2 < 1 32 𝑡 > 𝜆𝑅 
Not all buy good 2 𝐷2 < 1 𝑥1 > 0 32 𝑡 > 𝜆𝑅 
 
While Table 3.4 is good for consistency with the other chapters, Figure 3.9 gives a better 
overview of how the range of the consumers’ willingness to pay for the second paper affects 
the outcome of the model. Only two issues remain to be answered by a practitioner: 
(1) How is the consumers’ disutility of picking something other than their favourite 
compared to the price they’re willing to pay for that same first-best? 
(2) What degree of the initial willingness to pay remains when considering the second 
purchase? 
Figure 3.9: Range of values for λ and corresponding system results 
 
The difference between an outcome with no equilibrium and one in which all consumers buy 
both turns out to be exactly the ratio of t to R. Take therefore the consumer at one end of the 
line and divide his loss in utility from reading a paper at the other end by his maximum 
willingness to pay. Half of this ratio is the minimum required degree of remaining reservation 
price for the second purchase if the model is to be stable. Add to that one unit of the ratio and 
everyone buys two newspapers. Utility is notoriously abstract and hard to quantify. Using 
relative sizes will hopefully make rough estimates easier. 
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Advertising is a central feature in two-sided media models that is missing here. Assuming that 
advertisers only want to reach as large an audience as possible, minimal differentiation makes 
the firms perfect substitutes. Consequently, one could suspect that price competition in this 
end of the market would pull down profit as the firms locate further towards the middle. This 
is the opposite of the effect on the consumer end. Which effect would dominate is hard to say 
without a complete model and is therefore an obvious candidate for further study. 
Coming from the other, single purchase, two-sided end of the field, Peitz and Valletti (2008) 
requested exactly this multi-purchase puzzle piece when they compared a model where 
advertising was the only source of funding for television (“free-to-air”) with one including 
viewer payment (“pay-tv”). In their system, which uses quadratic transportation costs, the 
model that included viewer fees gives maximal differentiation. If some of the consumers were 
willing to pay for a second channel, Kim and Serfes (2006), who also use quadratic transport, 
indicate that the incentive to differentiate would be weakened. This paper confirms the same 
tendency in linear systems. 
Admittedly the idea of a second good works better with newspapers than television. Peitz and 
Valletti (2008) suggest the model constructed by Anderson and Neven (1989) as a way to 
implement multi-purchasing, but we have already argued that their model of fractional 
consumption is a poor fit for information goods. This underlines the difference between 
television, where one cannot consume two shows that air at the same time, and papers, where 
the publishing date is irrelevant to how many one can read. Still, Gal-Or and Dukes (2003) 
use Anderson and Neven’s model to find minimal differentiation between TV channels 
because of the effect of substitutability of the channels on competition between advertisers. 
Their result depends on a fixed difference between the goods being advertised but points 
towards the need to look at the effect of advertising combined with multi-purchasing. 
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4 Bundling in the linear city 
Now that the main multi-purchasing incentives are established, we investigate the model 
when the firms act as one monopolist with two products. With variety still as our motivation, 
we let the monopolist offer both goods as one bundle. Even without selling the bundle, a 
monopolist will want to exploit the diversity in preferences among the consumers by placing 
the goods apart. Package selling is designed explicitly to divide consumers by their 
willingness to pay and thus adds a new layer to our study of differentiation. 
Bundling is also inspired by media markets. For example, cable TV can come in packages 
with hundreds of channels. Newspapers have not traditionally been bundled, but the 
challenges to their business model introduced by the Internet have brought new vigour to the 
debate on how best to pay for access to news. Another market where electronic publishing is 
taking over is that for academic journals, Kim and Serfes’ (2006) second example of when 
multi-purchasing can be expected to occur. Journals are commonly sold to universities in 
large bundles while actors outside of academia pay rather expensive fees for single 
purchases.18 This chapter aims to predict what package selling does to information diversity. 
This chapter is structured as follows. We begin by establishing the workings of a basic 
monopoly without multi-purchasing. Then we turn Hotelling’s starting point inside out; his 
model forced each consumer to buy one, and only one, good. We will make them buy both. 
Finally, we will discuss mixed bundling. To keep the discussion of mixed bundling tractable 
we require that the market is covered. No resale will be allowed. This chapter assumes equal 
marginal costs: 𝑐1 = 𝑐2 = 𝑐. 
 
4.1 Single purchase monopoly 
Given that no fixed costs have been introduced, a monopolist would still prefer to produce 
two goods even if no customer bought more than one of them. He would do so because 
spreading the goods out would mean that less utility was lost in transport and could therefore 
be taken up in a higher price instead. 
As long as the monopolist wants to cover the whole market, meaning total demand is fixed to 
one, price is the only element to worry about. The logic is the same for both goods, so their 
                                                 
18 Both cable TV and journals in universities are also cases where access is so seamless (just turn on your TV or 
log on to the Internet through a campus computer) that transaction costs are not a problem. This lets us exclude 
another potential motivation for bundling and leaves us focused on price discrimination. 
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locations will be symmetrical. Optimal locations should be such that the marginal consumer 
on both sides has zero utility, and the outer side is clearly at the end of the line. The utility 
curves of buying either good should meet at the midpoint and equal zero. In short, to 
maximize price means to minimize transport for the marginal consumer, and that is done at 
𝑎 = 𝑏 = 1
4
. This is illustrated in Figure 4.1 below. This location is also socially optimal. 
Mathematically, the results are: 
𝑝1 = 𝑝2 = 𝑅 − 14 𝑡 
𝜋1+2 = 𝑅 − 14 𝑡 − 𝑐 
Figure 4.1: Utility under optimal locations for a single purchase monopoly when the market is covered 
 
An uncovered market has the same symmetrical margins, but a higher price. Just like in the 
competitive model it does not matter which part of the market is left untouched. Let 𝑙 > 0 be 
the percentage share of the line left with positive utility – which equals demand – when the 
price is increased to 𝑝1 = 𝑝2 = 𝑅 − 14 𝑡𝑙. Profit is maximized at 𝑙 = 2𝑡 (𝑅 − 𝑐). To want to 
supply the whole market the monopolist would need to see 1
2
𝑡 + 𝑐 < 𝑅. Marginal social costs 
would only be 1
4
𝑡 + 𝑐. Hence, we observe double transport costs compared with what 
maximizes welfare. Recalling Table 3.3, we expect multi-purchasing to occur if  1
2
𝑡 + 𝑐 < 𝜆𝑅 
is true, so as soon as we allow consumers to buy what they want, a covered single-purchase 
monopoly seems unlikely. 
 
4.2 Pure bundling 
The utility of buying both goods, u12, is the only new element in our model compared to the 
standard Hotelling version. We proceed to look at it in isolation. That is, the consumers can 
no longer buy either good separately. This gives us a model of pure bundling. Price becomes a 
single parameter pB and the production cost of one bundle is 2c. For a set of locations a and b, 
the consumers’ utility over x is illustrated in Figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2: Utility with pure bundling 
 
Of course, only consumers with a positive utility will choose to buy the bundle. Consumers at 
the extremes of the line will clearly be the first to reach zero utility for any choice of (a,b). 
These will have transport costs totaling t if locations are symmetric, more in one end if not. 
Symmetric locations will therefore let the monopolist extract the greatest profit when the 
consumers are uniformly distributed. As a result, the highest price the monopolist can charge 
and still sell to all customers is 𝑝𝐵0 = (1 + 𝜆)𝑅 − 𝑡. Profit becomes 
𝜋𝑃𝐵 = (1 + 𝜆)𝑅 − 𝑡 − 2𝑐 
Maximizing profit is a question of what share of the consumers the monopolist wants to serve. 
Again, let 𝑙 > 0 be the percentage share of the line left with positive utility when the price is 
increased to 𝑝𝐵1 = (1 + 𝜆)𝑅 − 𝑙𝑡 as in Figure 4.3. Demand is then 𝐷𝐵 = 𝑙. These expressions 
are independent of the firm’s placement decision as long as 𝑎 + 𝑏 ≤ 𝑙 because only the 
marginal consumer counts. 
Figure 4.3: Utility with pure bundling when not all consumers are served 
 
If we combine price and demand together in a profit function, first order conditions will show 
that the optimal share of consumers to serve is 
𝑙 = 12𝑡 [(1 + 𝜆)𝑅 − 2𝑐] 
All consumers are included if 𝑙 ≥ 1. That is, if 
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 (1 + 𝜆)𝑅 ≥ 2𝑡 + 2𝑐 (4.1) 
From a social point of view, the share of the line to service should be determined by marginal 
revenue, (1 + 𝜆)𝑅, and marginal social cost, 𝑡 + 2𝑐. This is a less restrictive condition than 
(4.1). In other words, a pure bundling monopoly is inefficient in the same double-transport 
way that we have seen earlier. Moreover, the firm’s decision of where along the line to place 
the goods is only a choice of leaving surplus for those consumers between the extremes. A 
social optimum is to locate in the middle of the served line. In comparison, Hotelling’s 
standard model has a socially optimal placement at a quarter of the line’s length inwards from 
each side. 
Interestingly, (4.1) is also the condition for when pure bundling becomes more profitable for 
the monopolist than to offer the goods separately in the ordinary Hotelling single purchase 
model with (0,1) placements. Next we combine these two in a model of mixed bundling with 
fixed locations. 
 
4.3 Mixed bundling with exogenous locations 
Mixed bundling means that consumers are free to buy either good separately or a package 
with both. This will change the utility of buying both goods and consequently gives us new 
consumer actions as expressed in the intersections and demand functions. If the bundle is 
going to be better than just buying both separately, we need 𝑝𝐵 < 𝑝1 + 𝑝2. 
Our approach remains the same: demand is determined by the greatest utility, and firms 
interact with the market through pricing. As before we start with exogenously given locations 
at the extreme ends of the line. Mixed bundling will be restricted to a covered market. 
Given the choice of buying either good 1, good 2 or the bundle, a consumer located at point 
𝑥 ∈ [0,1] will have the following respective utilities: 
𝑢1 = 𝑅 − 𝑡𝑥 − 𝑝1 
𝑢2 = 𝑅 − 𝑡(1 − 𝑥) − 𝑝2 
𝑢𝐵 = (1 + 𝜆)𝑅 − 𝑡 − 𝑝𝐵 
Each consumer selects the option that gives him the greatest utility. Two indifferent 
consumers can be located just like before, and we denote the intersections where they are 
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found in the same way: x1 is where the utility of buying the bundle starts being greater than 
that of buying only good 1, whereas x2 is where the utility of buying good 2 starts being 
greater than that of buying the bundle. 
 
𝑥1 = 1 − 1𝑡 (𝜆𝑅 + 𝑝1 − 𝑝𝐵) (4.2) 
 
𝑥2 = 1𝑡 (𝜆𝑅 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝𝐵) (4.3) 
Demand is defined by the intersections of the utility functions.  
𝐷1 = 𝑥1 = 1 − 1𝑡 (𝜆𝑅 + 𝑝1 − 𝑝𝐵) 
𝐷2 = 1 − 𝑥2 = 1 − 1𝑡 (𝜆𝑅 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝𝐵) 
𝐷𝐵 = 𝑥2 − 𝑥1 = 1𝑡 (2𝜆𝑅 + 𝑝1 + 𝑝2 − 2𝑝𝐵) − 1 
If at least some consumers are to buy only one good, we need 𝐷1 > 0 and 𝐷2 > 0, which 
means that 𝑥1 > 0 and 𝑥2 < 1 respectively. Geometrically, the utility functions should 
intersect within the line. Using (4.2) and (4.3) gives 
 𝑝1 < 𝑡 − 𝜆𝑅 + 𝑝𝐵 (4.4) 
 𝑝2 < 𝑡 − 𝜆𝑅 + 𝑝𝐵 (4.5) 
In order for at least some consumers to buy the bundle, we require that 𝐷𝐵 > 0, which means 
that 𝑥1 < 𝑥2, just as multi-purchasing in the competitive model. Using (4.2) and (4.3) gives 
 
𝑝𝐵 < 𝜆𝑅 − 12 𝑡 + 12 (𝑝1 + 𝑝2) (4.6) 
We will discuss these expressions in detail once prices have been established. 
The monopolist wants to maximize the total profit coming from those consumers buying only 
good 1, those buying only good 2 and those buying the bundle. 
𝜋𝑀𝐵 = (𝑝1 − 𝑐)𝐷1 + (𝑝2 − 𝑐)𝐷2 + (𝑝𝐵 − 2𝑐)𝐷𝐵 
Since the utility of buying the bundle is a flat line, the bundle can be priced to extract all 
surplus from the consumers who choose that option. That is, 
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𝑝𝐵 = (1 + 𝜆)𝑅 − 𝑡 
Maximizing profit with respect to the price of each separate good then gives 
𝑝1 = 𝑝2 = 12 (2𝑝𝐵 + 𝑡 − 𝜆𝑅 − 𝑐) 
 
𝑝1 = 𝑝2 = 12 ((2 + 𝜆)𝑅 − 𝑡 − 𝑐) (4.7) 
 
𝐷1 = 𝐷2 = 12𝑡 (𝑡 + 𝑐 − 𝜆𝑅) (4.8) 
From (4.8) we see that positive demand for either separate good, say 𝐷1 > 0, results in the 
condition 𝜆𝑅 < 𝑡 + 𝑐. An intuitive interpretation is that some will opt to buy only one good if 
the benefit of a second good to the consumer placed farthest away from it is lower than the 
product’s marginal private cost. 
Correspondingly, the bundle’s demand, DB, has to be positive. This requirement was 
previously expressed in (4.6). 
𝐷𝐵 = 1𝑡 (𝜆𝑅 − 𝑐) 
Fully solved the requirement becomes 𝑐 < 𝜆𝑅. As long as the consumers’ reservation price 
for the second good is greater than the cost of producing the additional unit, the bundle will be 
sold. 
In combination we thus have a very simple interval in which mixed bundling is possible: 
𝑐 < 𝜆𝑅 < 𝑡 + 𝑐 
The willingness to pay for a second good must be greater than the minimal private cost of 
consuming it and less than the maximal. If it falls below this interval, a single purchase 
monopoly takes place. Above, pure bundling rules. For as long as the function is defined, 
mixed bundling is more profitable than pure bundling or single sales. 
Altogether profit becomes 
𝜋𝑀𝐵 = 12𝑡 �(2𝑅 + 𝜆𝑅 − 𝑡 − 3𝑐)(𝑡 + 𝑐 − 𝜆𝑅) + 2�(1 + 𝜆)𝑅 − 𝑡 − 2𝑐�(𝜆𝑅 − 𝑐)� 
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4.4 Mixed bundling with endogenous locations 
To build a model of bundling when the monopolist is free to choose where to locate his two 
goods is an optimization problem with many parameters and conditions. Using the lessons 
from the previous subchapters we can simplify the calculation to one with symmetrical 
margins. Symmetry will still ensure that the least possible willingness to pay is lost to 
transport costs. Prices will continue to aim to leave the marginal consumer with no utility left 
over. Before we come that far, however, we should follow the usual steps and establish the 
basic properties of the utility curves. 
𝑢1 = 𝑅 − 𝑡|𝑥 − 𝑎| − 𝑝1 
𝑢2 = 𝑅 − 𝑡|1 − 𝑏 − 𝑥| − 𝑝2 
𝑢𝐵 = (1 + 𝜆)𝑅 − 𝑡(|𝑥 − 𝑎| + |1 − 𝑏 − 𝑥|) − 𝑝𝐵 
Next we find where the two indifferent consumers will be, still the same procedure as before. 
𝑢1(𝑥1) = 𝑢𝐵(𝑥1) ⇒ 𝑥1 = 1 − 𝑏 − 1𝑡 (𝜆𝑅 + p1 − pB) 
𝑢2(𝑥2) = 𝑢𝐵(𝑥2) ⇒ 𝑥2 = 𝑎 + 1𝑡 (𝜆𝑅 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝𝐵) 
As usual we want the intersections to happen in the right order: 𝑥1 < 𝑥2. To test for this in a 
separate step is redundant, however, because we might as well require that the demand for the 
bundle is positive. Algebraically, 𝐷𝐵 = 𝑥2 − 𝑥1 > 0 ⇔ 𝑥1 < 𝑥2. Demand, then, is: 
𝐷1 = 𝑥1 = 1𝑡 �(1 − 𝑏)𝑡 − 𝜆𝑅 − 𝑝1 + 𝑝𝐵� 
𝐷2 = 1 − 𝑥2 = 1𝑡 �(1 − 𝑎)𝑡 − 𝜆𝑅 − 𝑝2 + 𝑝𝐵� 
𝐷𝐵 = 𝑥2 − 𝑥1 = 1𝑡 (2𝜆𝑅 − (1 − 𝑎 − 𝑏)𝑡 + 𝑝1 + 𝑝2 − 2𝑝𝐵) 
Symmetrical margins will apply here just as in the previous subchapters on bundling. 
Crucially, we now ask not only that the buyers of the bundle have binding utility but that 
buyers of the single good at the ends of the line are also considered. Single purchase prices 
therefore become 
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𝑢1(0) = 0 ⇒ 𝑝1 = 𝑅 − 𝑎𝑡 
𝑢2(1) = 0 ⇒ 𝑝2 = 𝑅 − 𝑏𝑡 
Like in the competitive model we require 𝑥1 < 1 − 𝑏 and 𝑥2 > 𝑎 to achieve the above 
expressions, but these restrictions will not be a problem. 
The utility curve from buying the bundle is a flat line between the two goods’ locations 
because the transport involved in consuming both is constant. Let therefore 𝑢𝐵(𝑥) = 0 for 
𝑥 ∈ [𝑥1, 𝑥2]. The bundle’s price is then 
𝑝𝐵 = (1 + 𝜆)𝑅 − (1 − 𝑎 − 𝑏)𝑡 
This expression assumes that no consumers outside of the flat part of the curve should ever 
buy the bundle. That is, 𝑥1 > 𝑎 and 𝑥2 < 1 − 𝑏. Following that assumption, the monopolist 
can practice perfect price discrimination against the group that buys the bundle because he 
knows that they will all have the same transport costs of (1 − 𝑎 − 𝑏)𝑡 from consuming both 
goods. From a group with heterogeneous preferences comes thus an identical sum along that 
part of the curve. 
Substituting the price functions into demand gives a set of very simple expressions. 
𝐷1 = 2𝑎 
𝐷2 = 2𝑏 
𝐷𝐵 = 1 − 2𝑎 − 2𝑏 
Consequently, profit is reasonably simple as well. 
𝜋 = (𝑝1 − 𝑐)𝐷1 + (𝑝2 − 𝑐)𝐷2 + (𝑝𝐵 − 2𝑐)𝐷𝐵 = 2𝑎(𝑅 − 𝑎𝑡 − 𝑐) + 2𝑏(𝑅 − 𝑏𝑡 − 𝑐) + (1 − 2𝑎 − 2𝑏)�(1 + 𝜆)𝑅 − (1 − 𝑎 − 𝑏)𝑡 − 2𝑐� 
So far we have only discussed pricing at the margins. Now symmetry is introduced by saying 
that 𝑎 = 𝑏. Note that single purchase demand, which has to be positive, is then defined for 
𝑎 > 0,  and bundle demand, which also has to be positive in order for the model to make 
sense, is defined for 𝑎 < 1
4
. Already we see that maximal differentiation cannot happen. 
Profit simplifies to 
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𝜋 = 4𝑎(𝑅 − 𝑎𝑡 − 𝑐) + (1 − 4𝑎)�(1 + 𝜆)𝑅 − (1 − 2𝑎)𝑡 − 2𝑐� 
To find the optimal level of differentiation we take the first order condition of profit with 
respect to location. Second order conditions can verify that we have a maximum. 
 𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑎
= 0 ⇒ 𝑎 = 112𝑡 (3𝑡 + 2𝑐 − 2𝜆𝑅) (4.9) 
Profit is maximized at an intermediate level of differentiation. The location of each good will 
be closer to the ends of the line for greater reservation prices for the second purchase because 
it will then pay to have more people buy the bundle. After all, the bundle extracts all surplus 
from its buyers. Opposing that effect, we also find that the higher the transportation cost, the 
more important it is to segment away the low-paying consumers at the line’s extremes by 
having them buy only a single good. The latter observation comes from 𝜕𝑎
𝜕𝑡
= 𝜆𝑅−𝑐
6𝑡
, which is 
positive when 𝜆𝑅 > 𝑐. As we will soon see, that condition has to be true anyway, so location 
is always increasing in transportation costs. 
Summing up we have the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3: Mixed bundling will result in intermediate differentiation. The two goods will 
always have at least half the line between them as long as mixed bundling is defined. 
Differentiation increases when 
i) the willingness to pay for a second good increases �𝜕𝑎
𝜕𝜆
< 0� 
ii) transport costs decrease �𝜕𝑎
𝜕𝑡
> 0� 
 
Figure 4.4 shows the resulting utility curves using the same parameters as we have used in 
previous graphs.19 The figure makes it clear just how many consumers the monopolist is able 
to meet with perfect price discrimination; the group buying the bundle is just a long line 
squeezed flat on the x-axis. The customers who only buy one good are still left with some 
surplus. 
                                                 
19 Made using 𝑅 = 10, 𝜆 = 0.5, 𝑡 = 5, 𝑐 = 1 ⇒ 𝑎 = 𝑏 = 7
60
= 0.116�  
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Figure 4.4: Utility with mixed bundling 
 
Returning to the requirement that demand for the bundle should be positive, 𝐷𝐵 > 0, which 
resulted in 𝑎 < 1
4
, we insert (4.9) into the inequality and find that this is true as long as 𝑐 <
𝜆𝑅. Hence, we are left with the claim that if bundling is going to happen, then the willingness 
to pay for the second good should be greater than the cost of producing it – not an 
unreasonable demand. If the condition does not hold, we will have single sales only. 
Requiring that demand for the individual goods should be positive, 𝐷1 > 0 for example, is the 
same as saying that 𝑎 > 0. Using (4.9) the inequality becomes 3
2
𝑡 + 𝑐 > 𝜆𝑅. This is the same 
condition as we have seen in Table 3.3 for the requirement that not all consumers buy one of 
the goods in the competitive model and serves the same purpose here: if not everyone buys 
good 2, then some are buying just good 1. If the willingness to pay for a second good 
becomes too big and the condition does not hold, we will have pure bundling. Altogether, 
mixed bundling works over the following interval: 
 
𝑐 < 𝜆𝑅 < 32 𝑡 + 𝑐 (4.10) 
Compared to mixed bundling with fixed locations at the endpoints, the upper limit to the 
willingness to pay is now higher. The interval is further discussed in the next subchapter. 
 
4.5 Discussion of results 
The monopolist adapts to achieve symmetrical margins. Symmetry is needed to minimize 
utility lost to transport costs. The focus on the marginal consumer is a simple question of what 
share of the market to cover. 
Figure 4.5 below illustrates the monopolist’s profit when 𝑅 = 10, 𝑡 = 4, 𝑐 = 2. Single sales 
mean that no consumers buy a second good, so profit is independent of λ and appears as a flat 
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line. Profit under mixed bundling is a quadratic in terms of λ because it appears both in the 
expressions for price and – through a – for demand. Pure bundling, which takes over from 
mixed with no discontinuity, is linear in terms of λ. 
Figure 4.5: Profit for each demand scenario in mixed bundling with endogenous locations 
 
Compared to Adams and Yellen (1976), who find that pure bundling, mixed bundling and 
single sales can all be the most profitable choice, the strategic choices are simpler in our 
model. As long as mixed bundling is possible, it will be better than the other options. The 
discontinuity in Figure 4.5 between single sales and mixed bundling gives an easy illustration 
of why this claim must be true in that case. Algebraically, the profit from mixed is greater 
than that from pure bundling as long as 𝜆𝑅 < 3
2
𝑡 + 𝑐, but that has to be true for mixed 
bundling to be defined anyway. Adams and Yellen required the goods to be independent. In 
an address model they are anything but. Indeed, firms can choose their own degree of 
substitutability – the opposite of differentiation – through their locations, which affect the 
consumers because of transport costs. Although mixed bundling will only happen when the 
goods are at least somewhat apart, substitutability will increase when transport costs increase 
in our final model. 
Choi (2010) was the direct inspiration for this paper. He also finds that “the number of multi-
homing consumers increases with tying” (Choi, 2010, p. 619). Even though his bundle 
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includes a different set of goods than ours and is based on fixed locations at the ends of the 
line, the conclusion reinforces the link between multi-purchasing when people enjoy both 
brands and bundling as a tool for harvesting consumers’ diversity. 
Returning to media markets, where the marginal cost of production is likely negligible, the 
bundle will be sold for all reservation prices for the second good because the lower limit of 
(4.10) is then zero. The upper limit is the same as under the competitive duopoly in chapter 3, 
and even with nonzero costs the monopoly model has a weaker lower limit. Multi-purchasing 
is therefore more likely to occur under a monopoly than under the ordinary duopoly. More 
people are likely to read both newspapers if they are made by a monopolist than if they are 
only offered competitively. 
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5 Conclusion 
This paper has sought to map the differentiation of the linear Hotelling (1929) model’s two 
goods when consumers are permitted to buy both of them. In a competitive market the result 
is minimum differentiation given that multi-purchasing does indeed occur. As opposed to the 
ordinary linear Hotelling model, our result is stable but – according to our conjecture – only 
as long as the goods have the same marginal cost. Differentiation increases under 
monopolistic bundling but is not maximal. 
Multi-purchasing in a competitive market has been modeled before under quadratic 
transportation costs by Kim and Serfes (2006). They, too, find minimum differentiation and 
explain the observation by what they call the aggregate demand creation effect. Simply put, 
approaching the middle of the market no longer steals customers from the other good, but 
enlarges the group willing to buy both. We confirm this effect in the linear model. Another 
consequence of the effect is that price competition between the goods disappears. Hence, the 
old problem of Bertrand competition at the midpoint, which is the source of the linear model’s 
stability issues, is also gone. 
Transportation costs, be they linear or quadratic, represent the degree to which consumers 
dislike having to buy a good that is not perfectly aligned with their preferences. In single 
purchase models this unwillingness to buy something far away from one’s ideal works as a 
competitive barrier to increase the firms’ profits. Yet transportation determines the intervals 
for which multi-purchasing occurs. Since the aggregate demand creation effect means that 
both firms want to increase the number buying both goods, transportation costs pull profits 
down in the competitive multi-purchasing model. 
Two-sided markets and other media models need multi-purchasing. Even though buying from 
both platforms/newspapers is important enough to have a term of its own – multi-homing – in 
the literature on two-sided markets and the linear city is a common building block on the 
consumer side, no one has yet tested how advertisers will change the newspapers’ incentive to 
create generic content. This paper provides simple conditions for when multi-purchasing will 
occur and opens for implementation in an extended system in future research. Furthermore, it 
also lays the groundwork for a study of bundling in two-sided markets. 
Finally, differentiation is greater under a monopoly than a duopoly. Multi-purchasing is also 
more likely to occur. Variety is therefore greater under a monopoly. Contrary to expectations 
as that observation may be, anti-trust regulators or other government agencies should not 
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conclude based only on this paper on what a social planner would do. First of all, it may very 
well be that diversity is not really wanted by the consumers. Any preference for variety would 
have to involve an interpretation of λ because it is what multi-purchasing depends on. Second, 
the welfare implications of multi-purchasing in the linear Hotelling model have not been 
properly discussed in this study. Part of such an exercise would also include calculating 
whether the two duopolists would want to merge, as chapter 4 of this paper simply takes for 
granted. All this paper has done in terms of welfare is to determine that a monopolist would 
provide a more restrictive supply than socially optimal in the cases of single sales only and 
pure bundling, but that is hardly a surprise. The question of the socially optimal locations for 
two goods under multi-purchasing remains unanswered. In conclusion, we have not yet 
established if variety is a good thing, but we now know that a Hotelling duopoly will have 
none of it. 
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6 Appendix 
Proof that the assumptions behind the covered and uncovered model cannot be true at the 
same time 
Recall that (3.19) gives the condition for an uncovered market: 2𝑅 < 𝑡(𝑎 + 𝑏) + 𝑝1 + 𝑝2 
The market is covered if (3.19) has the opposite direction. Using the price reaction functions 
from the covered model give 
𝜆𝑅 < 2𝑅 − 32 (𝑎 + 𝑏)𝑡 − 12 (𝑐1 + 𝑐2) 
The price reaction functions from the uncovered model give a rewritten version of (3.20): 3𝑅 − 2(𝑎 + 𝑏)𝑡 − 𝑐1 − 𝑐2 < 𝜆𝑅 
Suppose there is a combination of parameters such that both models pass all their 
assumptions. Then both the above inequalities are true and we get 
3𝑅 − 2(𝑎 + 𝑏)𝑡 − 𝑐1 − 𝑐2 < 𝜆𝑅 < 2𝑅 − 32 (𝑎 + 𝑏)𝑡 − 12 (𝑐1 + 𝑐2) 
𝑅 < 12 (𝑎 + 𝑏)𝑡 + 12 (𝑐1 + 𝑐2) 
Yet this cannot be true at the same time as the multi-purchasing requirement in the covered 
model from Table 3.2 when 𝜆 ≤ 1. Hence, both models cannot be true at once. 
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